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The paper considers various theoretical perspectives that underscore the relevance of managing difference in a multinational state and the various strategies used by state in regulating difference in general and to Pakistan specifically. It then briefly illustrates the central features of federalism at different points in Pakistan’s history and then considers the actually practise of managing difference at various historical junctures. A critical analysis of the various alterative approaches is then considered and an evaluation of the pro and cons of each suggestion is made allowing for reflections on possible policy development.
Management of Ethnicity in the era of globalization
Ethnic mobilizations have been a persistent problem in Pakistan’s history and considerable angst and blood has been spilled over this issue. The breakup of the country in 1971 with the emergence of an independent Bangladesh and continuing difficulties today in Baluchistan are a key reminder of the seriousness of the issue.  The concern is that on the 39th anniversary on the independence of Bangladesh there is almost a complete amnesia here in Pakistan with hardly any reference to the events that led up to the breakup of the country in 1971. Those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat their mistakes and past mistakes are being repeated by resorting to a military solution to a political problem in Baluchistan. To compound the problem, ethnicity has become more significant generally in the era of globalization. The process of social change has initiated processes that unleash ethnic and national movements challenging state systems, which were locked in states during the Cold War. The processes leading to the collapse of nation states, emergence of virulent forms of ethnic movements demanding statehood has been invigorated by the emergence of transnational processes that side-step the nation state, directly intersecting with the locale. It is a testament to the impact of globalization, which has been in part responsible for the explosion in ethnic and nationalist conflict, testified by the collapse of Yugoslavia, Somali and the emergence of East Timor as an independent country (Barber 2003, Castells 1997). It is in this context of transnational processes promoting ethnic national movements that Pakistan’s enduring difficulty in managing differences needs to be seen in. The issue of managing difference, in particularly the separatist impulses in Baluchistan are more difficult to handle due to transnational character of the opposition. State control has become vitiated by contemporary ethnic militancy that has diasporic support, financial and technical, and uses transnational media as both a political and cultural tool evading national control and national ideological and media hegemony.
Formally Pakistan is a federation; however, federalism has only been operating partially in its history, which has intensified complaints of majoritarian rule. Long stretches of military rule with its majoritarian compulsions have exacerbated the difficulties of managing ethnic mobilizations.  A highly centralised, top-down style of control associated with authoritarian rule simply exacerbates the difficulty in managing difference as shown by the Baluchistan example. Thus any discussion on Federalism its refinement and advancement is grounded on the assumption of democratic rule and rights of citizenship. 
Managing difference is a major concern for most nation states and various strategies are employed on the macro and micro level that involve various combinations of power sharing and recognition of cultural difference. For Charles Taylor the philosophical premise is that lack of recognition causes harm. Identity politics is shaped by its recognition or its absence or misrecognition and absence or misrecognition causes harm. The issue of absence or misrecognition causing harm becomes apparent when an overview of various strategies for managing difference is made (Goldberg 1994). Taxonomy of managing difference can be broadly divided into two strategies, those that attempt to eliminate difference- genocide, forced transfer of mass population, partition and/or secession; and those that try assimilate or manage difference –ranging from various form of majoritarinism including hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation and or federalism, consociationalism or power sharing and multiculturalism (McGarry and O’Leary 1993)
In Pakistan, it is alleged, partition, transfer of population, genocide, secession, assimilation, federalism and hegemonic control has all been applied for the elimination and regulation of difference. Partition of British India into two independent countries was accompanied with transfer of population in order to eliminate difference. This strategy of removing diversity persisted in the 1950s when communal violence in East Pakistan led to the forcible departure of the Hindu population to India. Finally the military’ response to political demand of East Pakistan was an attempt, it was alleged, to use genocide to eliminate difference and when this failed it resulted in succession and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. In post-1971-Pakistan dominant mode has been hegemonic control within a federal context, and the breakdown of hegemonic control has resulted in other procedures being applied (Samad 2007:77). 
Federalism in Pakistan
In formal constitutional terms the official mechanism for regulating ethnic difference in Pakistan is federalism. As a system for regulating ethnic conflict it can be successful if the boundaries between ethnic communities match the units of the federation. Federations tend to emerge out of multi-ethnic colonies, where administrative elites have an interest in sustaining the federation and it is usually justified in terms of large economic markets and greater security (McGarry and O’Leary 1993). Whereas in the United States the diversity of regions and people necessitated the decentralisation of power, to curb central government from becoming too powerful, in post-colonial states and in particular in South Asia this logic has been inverted and it is argued that strong federal governments are necessary to corral and homogenise diverse pluralities into the nation. Federalism was a common mechanism for managing difference in multi-national states on a macro-level and has been more successful in those states where some attempts has been to recognise difference.  In India the centre-state relationship combined with positive discrimination have been partially successful in managing difference. Recognising linguistic minorities by redrawing state boundaries proved to be successful in defusing tension, but the recognition of religion has been more problematic and this has been a cause of tension in Kashmir, the Punjab and North East India, while caste remains an intractable problem (Pandey 2007). 

Pakistan has experimented with different forms of constitutional arrangements within a federal framework, which became unworkable due to intractable political crisis. The inability to manage difference, primarily based on language, has been an enduring problem for the political system of Pakistan. Federalism in Pakistan and India is based on 1935 India Act, which initiated provincial autonomy in British India. The Act was designed deliberately to undermine the nationalist movements by providing some form of self-rule to the provinces while holding fast to the centre. The dilemma for Muslim nationalism was that to project a unified position at the centre it had to concede considerable autonomy, far more than it leadership would have liked, to the provincial affiliates. This strong desire for autonomy was underlined by the confederalist nature of the Lahore Resolution. With partition in 1947 the centre amassed enormous powers under the Independence of India Act and Muslim nationalism now adopted a centralising agenda due the exigencies of deteriorating relations with India and the population imbalance between the two wings of the country (Samad 2007, Waseem 2010). 
In the constitutional and political debates in the 1950s Punjabis and Muhajirs were the most vocal advocates of the construction of a strong centralised state and a single national language and were prepared, almost, to go to any means to achieve this goal. Here a minority raised fears of majoritarian domination and used their ascendancy of the state to maintain control and garbed their intentions in the discourse of parity.  However, the Bengali representatives in the legislature resisted this move and wanted a more decentralised federation, even if it meant reducing tension with India and thus undermining the call for a larger army and Bengali recognised as an officials state language. Simultaneously they attempted to use the political processes to translate their political majority into institutional predominance as well (Samad 1995).  
Parity between the two wings of the country was the basis of the 1956 and 1962 Constitution. The establishment of One Unit, which was the formation of West Pakistan, was a device, garbed as purely administrative, to establish Punjabi domination. The unification of West Pakistan was explicitly a vehicle for domination but was presented in such a manner as not to arouse the opposition of the minority provinces (Samad 1995: 173-4). The exclusion of Bengalis from the centre, the tightening grip of Karachi over East Pakistan, the insensitive handling of the language issue and the economic exploitation of the region pushed East Pakistan along the road of separatism. 
The 1973 Constitution was bi-cameral system, which had built in feature to restrain majoritarianism. While the lower house was elected on population basis the Senate provided for equal representation for the provinces which gave it a dampening role to the majoritarian impulses of the lower house. However the Senate had no authority over finance and the budget could by pass the Senate and receive assent form the Presidency directly. However with Musharraf’s 17th Amendment, besides expanding the two chambers, money bills had now to be presented to the Senate. The 1973 Constitution gave some recognition to language groups, introduced language based quotas for government employment and education (Waseem 2010). Critics who argue that all recruitment should be merit based forget that in colonial India Muslims were the beneficiaries of quotas and other forms of positive discrimination in competition with Hindus. The very groups critical of quotas were its beneficiaries in an earlier period (Samad 1995). The 18th of Amendment of 2010, a positive step forward, made parliament supreme reduced the power of the centre to intervene in provincial affairs, abolished the concurrent list, renamed NWFP as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and provide greater autonomy for Baluchistan. The Council of Common Interests, quasi-executive body to manage centre-province issues, which had been ineffective under Musharraf, was expanded, apparently strengthened and designated to report regularly to parliament. The National Finance Commission Award moved away from distribution of revenues on the criteria of population to a multi-criteria formulation based on underdevelopment, revenue collection and generation, and inverse population density. The centre’s share of revenue is considerably reduced as well (Dawn 13/12/2009). The Baluchistan package consisted of a range of constitutional, economic, political and social proposals to deal with the grievances of the province (SAMMA 25/11/2009).
Practice: Hegemonic control
However in Pakistan hegemonic control became the main system of managing ethnic differrence. Hegemonic control in liberal democracies appears less feasible as citizenship rights generally allow for and facilitate organisation and mobilisation around ethnicity. Generally democratisation can be seen as a facilitator for ethnic mobilisation. However, democracy can also lead to hegemonic control through majoritarian rule. Simply put it was rule thought the use of the carrot and stick. Authoritarian regimes controlled multiple cultures through coercive domination and elite cooptation. Ethnic divisions, both latent and active, particularly in periods of rapid modernisation, were suppressed. Control was hegemonic if explicitly violent ethnic challenges to state power were at an unacceptable high human cost. Hegemonic control accordingly was a system where ethnic challenges to state power were ‘unthinkable’ or ‘unworkable’ for subordinate communities. Hegemonic control in authoritarian regimes did not necessarily depend on the support of the largest ethnic groups but rather on the control of the coercive apparatus by an ethnic group, and there are many examples of ethnic minorities’ control of the security forces and the police allowing them to sustain hegemonic control (McGarry and O’Leary 1993). However in Pakistan after 1971 hegemonic control is associated with majoritarianism. 
The failure of dealing the problem politically and resorting to military means pushed East Bengal down the road of secession, which finally led to the emergence of a separate state. The resistance went underground during military rule and resurfaced with venom in the general upsurge for democracy a decade later. The essential demands of the Awami League – decentralisation, greater representation in the army, and respect for a majority decision in the assembly – would, if accepted, have undermined the foundations of the Punjabi dominated military-bureaucratic oligarchy. The class difference between landed elites of West Pakistan and the middle class opposition made the gulf between the two a chasm that the military believed could only be dealt with the mailed fist. The fact that 1,200 miles of Indian territory separated East and West Pakistan made the exercise of brute force a futile affair.  Here it is alleged that genocide and forced transfer of population was used to eliminate difference when hegemonic control broke down (Samad 2007). 
The state has not been ethnically neutral and the dominant linguistic group has been the Punjabis. The key institution where this preponderance is most clearly apparent is in the army and bureaucracy particularly at the highest level. Zulfikar Bhutto's regime used cooption with Sindhis by recognising the language and through quotas but coercion was used in dealing with the opposition that was primarily located in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The toppling of the National Awami Party-Jamiat-Ulama-Islam coalition in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and the incarceration of Wali Khan on trumped up charges alienated Pukhtuns. Their repression intensified the calls for greater autonomy. Meanwhile, the dismissal of Ataullah Mengal's government in Baluchistan precipitated a rebellion by the Baluch tribes. With the toppling of Bhutto’s regime and his execution and the expulsion of the PPP, the main political force in Sindh, from the central arena resulted in the flourishing of different forms of Sindhi nationalism. These developments were accompanied by a realignment of political forces both at the centre and in the centre’s relations with other minorities. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan increased the significance of the western provinces. Sensitive to the possibility that the opposition forces in Baluchistan might become surrogates for Soviet-Afghan plans for the destabilisation of Pakistan, Zia made a serious attempt to co-opt them; Baluch suspicions were not so easily allayed, but the regime did succeed in making them neutral towards it. In the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa the Establishment found its task easier as Pukhtun refugees from Afghanistan swung public opinion in favour of the centre's strategy against the Kabul regime. The fact that Pukhtuns were prominent in the army made this task easier and Pukhtun generals and bureaucrats played a significant role in the regime (Samad 2011, Noman 1990).
This coopting of Pukthuns, however, was at the expense of Muhajirs, and coercive rule was used against them. The shift against them had been initiated during Bhutto's government by the imposition of an upper ceiling on their recruitment into the civil service. This displacement expanded into other areas during Zia's time. Mainly Punjabi but also Pukhtun influence increased in Karachi at the expense of the Muhajirs. They were still influential in the Federal Government and in the administration in urban Sindh but their position was being eroded. This process of exclusion, ultimately, resulted in a shift in identification. Muhajirs had been the solid supporters of the Islamic parties as Islam was the justification for their presence in Pakistan. A younger generation of Muhajirs, however, realised that ethnicity was the only game on the table and they invented Muhajir ethnicity: the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM). The military had a hand in this ethnic polarisation by using the MQM to undermine Bhutto's government and install its favoured candidate Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. However the spiralling ethnic conflict unleashed in the province, combined with the general lawlessness due to the ‘Kalashnikov culture’ eventually forced the army to act against the MQM. Hegemonic control through cooptation and coercion was sustained during Musharraf’s rule. The Punjabi-Pukhtun coalition was reinforced with the MMA entering office in Sarhad and Baluchistan, and was augmented with the political inclusion of the Muhajirs, by bringing the MQM into a coalition both at the centre and at provincial level (Samad 2007).
The increasing centralisation of power made it difficult to deal with issues raised by groups that were not co-opted by the regime. Compare the handling of the Waziristan issue and of the grievances of Baluchistan by the centre. While Washington looks at the tribal area from a War on Terror perspective against Islamic militancy Islamabad has a more nuanced view. In contrast, Baluch grievances were looked at in a harsh light or dealt with by coercive strategies because they had no access to the centres of power in the armed forces. This group is not represented in the senior ranks of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy particularly in the crucial institution, the army. In Baluchistan there were a number of local concern: the issues of development, revenue from energy and mineral resources that are extracted in the province, and the construction of Gwadar. While initially it appeared that the Baluchistan problem is about resources, their extraction and revenue distribution, the construction of Gawadar presents a much more serious threat of difference being eliminated by assimilation. The migration of several million people to the city port would turn the Baluch into a minority population. With these tensions simmering in the background since 2000 there were attempts by the ruling party to consult with the Baluch leadership, and Musharraf relented and sent the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League to negotiate with Akbar Bughti. Senator Mushaid Hussain, Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on Baluchistan, was able to produce a number of recommendations on various contentious issues that concerned the province. However, events on ground overtook the Senate Sub-committee recommendations and in August the government killed Akbar Bughti the military moved to coercion in containing the opposition. This has spiralled into a cycle of violence between Baluch and the government and non-Baluch. Again a military solution is being employed for a political problem (Samad 2011).
Pakistani Debate
Any debate on federalism and its extension is grounded on the assumptions that there is democratic rule and citizen rights. It is the relationship between rights based on the individual and groups that discussion accommodating difference is located in on macro level (Kymlicka 1995). In the Pakistani debate on group rights federalism, confederalism, consociationalism, devolution of power and multiculturalism have all been promoted as solutions. All of these alternatives are based on the assumption that the military is not intervening in the political process, directly through coups d’état or indirectly through controlled democracy. They have weaknesses and strengths and are partial solutions that are effective on different levels. Some have argued for separatist solutions and there are various examples where separatism is a legitimate part of the political discourse. The First Minister of Scotland Alex Salmond can openly canvass for separatism but has not persuaded the electorate to support this agenda.  In contrast discussion of separatism by the Baluch has resulted in prosecution and harassment, disappearance and allegations of extra-judicial executions by security forces. In this context the rise of separatist influence has increased among the Baluch arguing the repression parallels the plight of Palestinians and morally the international community should intervene. They have arrived at this political juncture after the centre’s unwillingness to engage with their concerns. However the international community is motivated by interest and not moral considerations and a major concern at moment is that Pakistan shouldn’t become unstable. A broken Pakistan, an unlikely event, would be linked to scenarios of external intervention, civil war and Islamic militants raising fears of lose nukes. Washington would see this nightmare scenario as a game changer. In reality separatism would only become realistic if the Pakistani state was broken up and the danger would be that ethnic cleansing and genocide would accompany it. The troubles in Karachi in the 1990s indicated these possibilities, and the peoples keenest on separatism are also the most vulnerable to the violence that would be generated by it. Given the asymmetry between the Baluch and the Punjab human cost for the Baluch people would be considerable. 
Many academics have pointed out that the issue of accommodating cultural diversity is associated with the devolution of power and this can be best done within a federal framework. The federal structure in Pakistan is based the Government of India Act of 1935. However federalism, as discussed earlier, has been inverted from its original intentions as in the USA it was seen as means for curbing the powers of the centre while South Asia it is seen as a mechanism by centre to reign in regional and local particularities. Denial of autonomy to the regional and particularist groups is often a ploy for ‘internal imperialism’ (Rizvi 1993) and in the case of Pakistan this combined with majoritarian domination of the military and bureaucracy. Resulting in periodic collapse of the political process and the establishment of a new constitution. Thus giving rise to the demands of some Baluch and Sindhis that the constitution should be confederal in nature with greater autonomy for the provinces. They justify their claims on the Lahore Resolution of 1930, which envisaged two independent Muslim nations and where the constituent units of the western entity would be sovereign and independent (Samad 2007: 85-8). However the problem facing the federal approach reappears in any confederal solution: the asymmetry between the size and population of the Punjab and other provinces and the majoritarian control of the state remains unaffected. The domination of the military-bureaucratic elite by the Punjab would be untouched. There are also other issues associated with confederalism, which includes difficulty in efficient executive and legislative decision making as confederal components have considerable veto powers. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political paralysis is due to the confederal arrangement that gives the Serb minority to block decisions from the centre.
A way of remedying the over-centralisation of the federation is to consider redrawing provincial boundaries and to implement safeguards that strengthen federalism. Redrawing of boundaries would satisfy minorities’ demands for the protection of their cultural distinctiveness and end the domination of the Punjab (Adney 2007, Faruqui 2004, Talbot 2002). This in India was relatively successful in defusing tensions around language mobilizations. The division of the Punjab into at least three provinces resonates with a wider proposition made by Waseem and Burki (2002) that a Constitutional Convention should redraw all the provincial boundaries in order to achieve some balance between the federating units and that federating units should be reorganised on the basis of language groups. Thus Baluchistan would perhaps be divided between Baluchi and Pukhtun speakers, while Sindh provides a much more tricky problem of reorganisation between Sindhis and Muhajirs and the tribal areas merged into the settled districts of Sarhad. It would make the centre weaker, as it would not be dominated by one province, and would satisfy the demands of ethnic minorities. This is an admirable proposition to counterbalance the overwhelming domination of the Punjab in the present federal arrangement. The fact that the Punjab has a population of eighty million people, much larger than that of many nation-states, offers administrative reasons for redrawing provincial boundaries and there are a number of groups in the Punjab province that aspire for a separate identity; Siraki, Potohari and Mirpuri all chafe at the domination of central Punjab.  However, the issue of diversity within provinces remains an issue. Federations are only effective if the federating unit are co-terminus with linguistic and cultural differences, and there is no way that existing units could be subdivided into culturally homogeneous entities (Samad 2007). The same objection can be made to the confederal argument: that it is unable to cope with internal diversity. Redrawing boundaries has no impact on the majoritarian characteristics of the militarily-bureaucratic elite which is the main driver of hegemonic control. Redrawing boundaries also initiates a process where by smaller and smaller groups, sub-ethnic groups, demand recognition and this is accompanied by demands for territorial control. 
Alternatively it is suggested that decentralisation of power, through empowerment of local bodies, is an important factor in accommodating diversity. In reality, however, decentralisation is not a simple panacea. The first point that needs to be amplified is the tacit assumption that the democratic processes are not a disguise for military rule. A stratagem of non-democratic regimes from the colonial period to contemporary Pakistan was to allow for decentralisation of power on the local level, while retaining control at the centre. The trade-off was that by allowing some form of democratic processes on the local level, opposition to the regime would be deflated. In both the colonial and post-colonial examples the stratagem failed. The people were not prepared to be bribed by limited democratic processes while being denied a sovereign parliament. The irony is that democratically elected government are suspicious of local government and this relationship becomes more problematic if local bodies and provincial government represent different political parties (Shah 2004). The government’s interest was that local authority representatives should not undermine the provincial authorities. The same reluctance to decentralise was also been found in India, where state governments released that empowerment of Panchyats was undermining their authority (Tummala 1992) requiring a rebalancing of relations between the centre, state and local level. Local governance can be another tool in fiscal devolution, as development resources are normally channelled through them, however it require clear delineation of powers with the provincial authorities and under Musharraf it was used to encroach on provincial autonomy (PILER 2002). Waseem and Burki argued that the responsibilities and authorities of the three tiers – centre, provinces and local authorities – should be delineated through a consensus reaching process and not by authoritarian Diktat or majoritarian steamrolling (Waseem and Burki 2002). Local democracy on its own does not assist in the management of difference but combined with other techniques it can make policy implementation more effective.
The issue that needs to be considered when reflecting upon decentralisation of power and redrawing of boundaries is whether this can create local hegemony. In the movements for independent Bangladesh, Greater Baluchistan, Pukhunistan, Sindhu Desh and Muhajirstan, the assumption has been that they are reflecting homogeneous entities. Bangladesh, however, has difficulties in accommodating diversity represented by Biharis, Hindus and tribals in the Chittagong Hill tracts. Baluchistan has a substantial population of linguistic minorities and religious minorities and the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa possesses a substantial Hindko speaking population. In Karachi, too, we find a heterogeneous population. While Muhajirs are the largest group in the city, Karachi has the largest urban concentration of Pukhtun and Baluch people in the country and there is also a substantial Punjabi population, as well as a significant Sindhi minority. Thus decentralisation and provincial reorganisation, while benefiting the dominant group in each unit, would be clearly disadvantageous to minorities. The argument for decentralisation is that it allows for diversity and difference to be accommodated on the local level, but the local level itself in many cases is quite heterogeneous and, while Muhajirs would gain, minorities would in turn be marginalised and disenfranchised in the process. Decentralisation combined with redrawing of provincial boundaries would create a local hegemony that would exclude non-Muhajirs. The principle of majoritarian pluralism would result in a simple majority allowing the MQM to run the city but would disenfranchise significant elements of the population. Such an outcome is inconsistent with the aim of trying to acknowledge and accommodate cultural diversity and difference. The situation in Karachi is symptomatic of many regions in Pakistan in that there is great cultural diversity and difference but no mechanism for their recognition. The principle of equality of opportunity and non-discrimination needs to be consistently adhered to whether one is a minority or a majority (Samad 2011).

Lijphart (1979) has advocated that the solution lies in a federal consociational democracy combined with proportional representation, where there would be a coalition on the elite level representing the various ethnic groupings. In some respect this feature is common in Pakistan and the present PPP government implicitly reflects an elite contract.  Various forms of consociationalism exist such as in Holland, Belgium and Switzerland where language or religious difference is accommodated. In the case of Switzerland and Belgium it is language while in Holland it is faith based in all three cases it is combined with proportional representation. Proportional representation merely means that percentage of votes is reflected in a percentage of representatives instead of the first past the post principle where winner takes all. There are different forms of voting, party list system from of proportional representation – as in Sweden and Finland, single transferable vote – as in Australia, etc. This recognition of difference would be reinforced by an ethnic veto in the legislative assembly. There would be proportional representation, which would allow ethnic/religious minorities to be proportionately represented in the state institutions. This segmental autonomy would be located in a loose federal system or even a confederation, which would allow for segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy can be based on language as in the case of Switzerland and Belgium or religion as in the Netherlands. Thus in Belgium the local state is Francophonic or Flemish speaking depending on the locality. While marginalised minorities such as Sindhis and the Baluch would benefit as segmental autonomy would allow them to use the vernacular language in local and provincial institutions and proportional representation would give them greater representation on all three tiers of government. However from this process Muhajirs would not, as they are not asking for proportionate representation in state institutions but arguing that their dominance should be sustained and advanced as Urdu is an official language of governance. Proportional representation would also mean that Punjabis would maintain their dominant position by virtue of their numbers and historic prominence in the military-bureaucratic combine. Proportional representation would have no impact on the ethnic character of the military-bureaucratic elite. Another difficulty with proportional representation is that Islamic groups would have greater political influence but it is preferable to incorporate them politically and possible wean them of militancy. A breakdown, however on the elite level, would result in a political crisis as in the failure for the Flemish and Walloon blocks to agree on a coalition government in Belgium.  The success of coalition government in Pakistan is chequered and generally was short-lived and resulting in crisis (Samad 2011)
Federalism, confederalism and consociationalism are macro approach to managing difference while multiculturalism operates at the macro, meso and micro level. Charles Taylor identifies a normative conception of multiculturalism as a discourse codifying the procedural and substantive principles around which multicultural societies are organised (Goldberg 1994). Identity politics is shaped by its recognition, its absence or its misrecognition. This means that barriers discriminating against minorities, ethnic and religious, need to be dismantled so that there is a level playing field in employment, access to government services and resources and can include mother tongue education. For some groups positive discrimination in favour of minority groups would be necessary to accelerate their advance into key institutions. There are numerous example of positive discrimination in terms of education and employment as with the case with Afro-Americans in the USA and Dalits in India (Samad 1997, Pandey 2007). While positive discrimination is not legal in the United Kingdom but legislation does require that public bodies should not discriminate against minorities and that statistics are collected so that indirect discrimination can be detected (Equality and Human Rights Commission). This is precisely the point made by Sanaullah Baluch who argues that the key to Baluch advancement would be their presence, at senior level, in the key institution that dominates Pakistan, the army (Baluch 2005). 
Usually multiculturalism is accompanied by a language policy such as in Canada where Quebec is Francophonic and the rest of the country is Anglophonic.  Recognition of the vernaculars, including Urdu, by the state at all three levels would have considerable decentralising effects. Despite the official rhetoric the language of the upper echelons is English. Education policy that recognises vernacular languages and sanctions their use in the various tiers of governance would feed into employment and would have an empowering effect. It would introduce linguistic decentralisation facilitating ethnic minorities’ direct participation in the decision making process. This would lead to a change in power relations between the federation and the provinces and the provinces and local bodies and would end or reduce the power and authority of the present ruling elite. This, combined with proportionate representation and positive discrimination in favour of vulnerable ethnic minorities such as the Baluch and Sindhis, or religious minorities such as Hindus or Christians, would accelerate their incorporation into the establishment and bind all minorities more firmly into the Pakistan state (Rahman 1996, Rahman 1999).
 While Tariq Rahman’s (1996, 1999) is critical of the use of English as elitist, it does appear that in a globalised economy a workforce that engages with English would have a much better chance of participating in a global labour market. The Singaporean approach, where everyone in school learns their mother tongue, the national language and English, would have a positive effect in managing difference in Pakistan. It would allow skilled groups such as Muhajirs to engage more fruitfully with the global labour market. The opportunities for an English-speaking workforce range from call centres and transcription of manual records into electronic data bases to more high-end occupations such as IT and media workers (Samad 2011). 
Conclusion
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